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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Every Georgia attorney and trial court judge ought to set aside the
time to read every Georgia appellate court opinion on the subject of
evidence (or, for that matter, any other selected subject) rendered
during a given period of a year. The feel that one acquires for the
attitude of the appellate courts of Georgia is interesting. Most though,
will not have the time for such projects, so that to read someone else's
selections and comments may be of some benefit. It will not, however,
give the
"feel" that one acquires through an individual reading of the
1
cases.
This was former Georgia Supreme Court justice, former superior court
judge, and preeminent trial lawyer Hardy Gregory Jr.'s introduction to
his 1978 survey of evidence decisions for the Mercer Law Review. As
always, Justice Gregory got it right; there is no substitute for reading
cases. Today, the sheer volume of cases and our technological ability to
ferret out key words makes it even less likely we read an entire case,
much less all cases in a given area. This Survey, although perhaps a
helpful tool to get you part of the way to where you want to be, is no
substitute for a lawyer's own careful reading of the law. Perhaps the
* Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1981). Member, Mercer Law Review (1979-1981); Fifth Circuit Survey Editor (19801981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
The Author wishes to express his gratitude to his longtime assistant, Heatherlee
Hammonds. Ms. Hammonds has keyed approximately twenty of the Author's survey
articles, and she has become at least as proficient as many law students and more
proficient than most lawyers in the intricacies of citation form. Her expert assistance
makes the task much easier, and for that, I am truly grateful.
1. Hardy Gregory Jr., Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 30 MERCER L. REV. 91
(1978).
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best examples of this difficulty are cases interpreting and applying
Georgia's Daubert2 statute.3 While the Author has spent a lot of time,
perhaps too much time, trying to summarize these decisions, to truly
understand or get a feel for what the courts are doing in this critical
area, one must read the cases. This Article surveys developments in
Georgia
evidence law during the period of June 1, 2008 to May 31,
4
2009.

II.

PRESUMPTIONS

The destruction of evidence by a party can give rise to a presumption
that the evidence would have been harmful to that party,6 a presumption generally referred to as the "spoliation" presumption or the "adverse
inference" presumption.' As discussed in last year's survey, trial courts
can also impose additional sanctions for spoliation of evidence.7 During
the current survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals returned to the
issue of whether a finding of bad faith or misconduct is a necessary
prerequisite to the imposition of spoliation sanctions. This question has
been frequently raised in Georgia's appellate courts and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, but it is now settled
that bad faith is unnecessary to impose sanctions, although the degree
of a party's culpability is a factor the trial court should take into
account.8
In AMLI Residential Properties, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co.,' the
plaintiff contended that its property had been destroyed by a fire that
resulted from Georgia Power Company's negligence in maintaining and
operating electrical equipment that provided power to the plaintiff's
building. During a series of inspections conducted to determine the
cause of the fire, the plaintiff focused on two ground rods. The plaintiff

2.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

3. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2009).
4. For analysis of Georgia evidence law during the prior survey period, see Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 60 MERCER L. REV. 135 (2008).
5. Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 225 Ga. App. 523,525,484 S.E.2d 249,251 (1997).
6. See generally Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 49 MERCER L.
REV. 1027, 1031-32 (1998); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw,
49 MERCER L. REV. 149, 151-52 (1997).
7. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.
135, 136-38 (2008).
8. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1083,
1091 (2006); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 49 MERCER L. REV.
1027, 1031-32 (1998).
9. 293 Ga. App. 358, 667 S.E.2d 150 (2008).
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concluded that it would be necessary to excavate one of the ground rods
for testing and informed Georgia Power of its intention to do so.
However, before the scheduled excavation, a contractor retained by the
plaintiff removed a portion of one ground rod. At the scheduled
excavation, an excavator was unable to remove the remainder of the
ground rod. Still, the plaintiff did not inform Georgia Power that a
portion had already been removed. The plaintiff then conducted
metallurgical testing on the removed portion, and its experts concluded
that although the ground rod was exposed to heat, it was not exposed to
fire, a conclusion that implicated Georgia Power. Because the plaintiff
did not inform Georgia Power of the removal or the destructive testing
of the ground rod, Georgia Power moved in limine to preclude the
plaintiff from introducing any evidence relating to the ground rod.
Georgia Power then moved for summary judgment, contending that the
plaintiff could not establish causation without any evidence relating to
the ground rod. The trial court granted both motions. '
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that spoliation sanctions were not
appropriate because neither its experts nor its attorneys acted in bad
faith.1 ' The court of appeals disagreed, noting that exclusionary
sanctions for spoliation of evidence may be appropriate even when a
party has not acted in bad faith. 2 However, the degree of culpable
conduct is a factor in the determination of whether sanctions are
appropriate. 3 The court contrasted, on the one hand,
"the accidental, random, or unintended dissipation of evidence by
persons having no interest in its preservation," and those cases where
"a party knowledgeable of litigation strategy, tactics, and policies who
invokes the aid and jurisdiction of the Court and its processes ... acted
unfairly to preclude the opportunity of an adversary to be apprised of

the existence of a defense to a plaintiff's claims."14

In AMLI the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiff's removal of
the ground rod and its subsequent destructive testing, without notice to
Georgia Power, was wrongful even though not found to be in bad

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

358-61, 667 S.E.2d at 152-53.
361, 667 S.E.2d at 154.
363, 667 S.E.2d at 155.
363 n.2, 667 S.E.2d at 155 n.2.
363, 667 S.E.2d at 155 (alteration in original) (quoting N. Assurance Co. v.
Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281, 284 (D. Me. 1993)). The court of appeals in Chapman v. Auto
Owners Insurance Co. relied on Ware to formulate Georgia's five-factor test for the
imposition of sanctions for spoliation. 220 Ga. App. 539, 542, 469 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1996).
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faith.1" Considering the relative
culpability of the parties, spoliation
16
sanctions were appropriate.

III.
A.

RELEVANCY

Extrinsic Act Evidence

Since the Author began surveying evidence decisions for the Annual
Survey of Georgia Law in 1988,7 the most frequently encountered
evidence issue has almost certainly been whether "extrinsic act evidence"
is relevant. Extrinsic act evidence is evidence of conduct on occasions
other than the occasion at issue, and it is offered as substantive
evidence, as opposed to impeachment evidence. 8 Generally, extrinsic
act evidence is irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible. 9 This makes sense;
generally, defendants should be convicted based on evidence of what they
did on the occasion at issue, not upon what they did five, ten, or fifteen
years earlier. Nevertheless, like the rule against hearsay, the rule
against extrinsic act evidence is known more for its exceptions than its
flat prohibition. Most commonly, evidence of completely separate but
nonetheless similar transactions "'may be introduced to prove identity,
motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct. '"'2 This can
make sense as well; if a defendant committed an act that is so similar
to the charged offense that evidence of the prior events tends to prove he
committed the charged offense, then that evidence should be admitted.
However, criminal defense lawyers from scarcely more than a generation
or two ago would hardly recognize the state of today's law regarding
extrinsic act evidence. Georgia's appellate courts, however, "'do not

15. AMLI, 293 Ga. App. at 364, 667 S.E.2d at 155.
16. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 156. Although the court in AMLI relied in part on the fact that
the evidence was destroyed by the plaintiff, who had the burden of proof, exclusionary
spoliation sanctions are not limited to parties bearing the burden of proof. See Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 135, 136-38
(2008) (discussing the severe sanctions imposed against defendants who destroyed
evidence).
17. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 39 MERCER L. REV. 1259

(1988).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (1995).
19. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2.
20. Franklin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 405, 408, 376 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1988) (quoting
Sablon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 128, 130, 355 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1987)).
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concede, as suggested by some, that the exceptions have swallowed the
rule of inadmissibility of separate crimes. '" 21

During the current survey year, the criminal defense bar made its
strongest, but nevertheless unsuccessful, effort yet to limit the use of
extrinsic act evidence. First, in Wade v. State,22 the defendant in a
DUI case tried to present the court of appeals with a tailor-made
opportunity to change Georgia's extrinsic act evidence rule. The
defendant agreed to a bench trial on stipulated facts precisely so she
could appeal the admission of evidence of a prior conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol "to show [the defendant's] bent of mind
and course of conduct."' The defendant's appeal to the court of appeals
found a sympathetic ear. The court acknowledged that Georgia law had
evolved to the point that evidence of similar transactions was admissible
to show, among other things, bent of mind.24 The defendant argued
such evidence was particularly prejudicial in a DUI case "because the
State does not need evidence of a prior act to show motive, intent,
identity, plan, scheme, or other generally accepted rationale for
admitting such evidence."25
The court of appeals acknowledged that Georgia is the only state to
allow the admission of similar transaction evidence to prove bent of
mind and quoted Justice Sears's concern that "a person's 'bent of mind
is dangerously close to being his character, and a person's course of
conduct could easily show nothing more than a mere propensity to act
in a certain manner.'"26 Justice Sears's use of the word "propensity" is
significant. Federal courts, in determining whether extrinsic act
evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),27 often
look to see if the extrinsic act is merely propensity evidence, the
admission of which is not allowed.2" Georgia takes a different view.
In Carr v. State,2 9 Judge Eldridge noted that Georgia courts have

21. Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 626, 458 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1995) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 655, 272 S.E.2d 321, 322 (1980)).
22. 295 Ga. App. 45, 670 S.E.2d 864 (2008).

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 46, 670 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 47, 670 S.E.2d at 865.
Id., 670 S.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 48, 670 S.E.2d at 866 (quoting Farley, 265 Ga. at 630, 458 S.E.2d at 650

(Sears, J., concurring specially)).
27. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
28. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1083,

1092 (2006).
29. 251 Ga. App. 117, 553 S.E.2d 674 (2001).
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specifically held that "'propensity' can be a sufficient basis for the
admission of a similar transaction."'
In Wade the court of appeals seemed to agree that the pendulum had
swung too far, and the court openly questioned whether the broad
admission of evidence of conduct on other occasions should continue.3 1
However, as the court explained, its hands were tied. "Nevertheless, we
are not authorized to depart from the precedent of the Supreme Court
of Georgia authorizing the bent of mind rationale for admitting similar
transaction evidence," and thus, the court affirmed the defendant's
conviction.32

Clearly, the court of appeals was asking the Georgia

Supreme Court to grant certiorari and fix the problem, but the
supreme
33
court, without comment, denied certiorari on April 28, 2009.
However, a sharply divided supreme court weighed in on the issue in
Payne v. State.34 In Payne the defendant, who was convicted of
molesting his eleven-year-old stepdaughter on multiple occasions,
contended that the trial court erred when, to prove bent of mind and
course of conduct, it admitted evidence that in 1994 he sexually
assaulted a woman with whom he had previously lived.35 The court of
appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction, and the supreme court
granted certiorari.3 6

Noting the similarity between the two offens-

es-the victims were females with whom the defendant had a prior
relationship, both crimes were committed in the defendant's home or a
place where he had lived, both involved similar sexual acts, and both
victims were restrained and threatened with physical violence-a fourjustice majority of the supreme court held that the prior offense was
sufficiently similar to be admissible to show the defendant's bent of mind
and course of conduct.37

In an opinion written by then-Presiding Justice Hunstein, three
justices strongly dissented,3" decrying the erosion of the general rule
prohibiting the admission of extrinsic act evidence and calling the
majority's opinion an example of "the extent to which this limited

30. Id. at 121, 553 S.E.2d at 677 (Eldridge, J., concurring specially).
31. 295 Ga. App. at 48, 670 S.E.2d at 866-67.
32. Id. at 48-49, 670 S.E.2d at 866-67.
33. See Supreme Court of Georgia, Computerized Docketing System and Case Types,
http.//www.gasupreme.us/docket_search/results onerecord.php?docrcasenum--S09C9568
(last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
34. 285 Ga. 137, 674 S.E.2d 298 (2009).

35. Id. at 137-38, 674 S.E.2d at 299.
36.
37.

Id. at 137, 674 S.E.2d at 299.
Id. at 138, 139, 674 S.E.2d at 300.

38. Id. at 139-40, 674 S.E.2d at 300 (Hunstein, P.J., dissenting).
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exception has been stretched over time."39 While the dissent acknowledged that appellate courts have repeatedly held that the exception for
extrinsic act evidence could be construed broadly in cases of sexual
assault, it also stated that "we have never approved such an expansive
construction as the majority adopts herein."40 Quoting Farley v.
State,41 just as the court of appeals did in Wade, the dissent worried
that "bent of mind and course of conduct have evolved into amorphous
catch-phrases, difficult to define and slippery in application."42
In fact, Georgia courts have repeatedly noted that the bent of mind
involved in sex crimes against children is unique, and a sexual assault
against an adult woman cannot be used to prove a lustful disposition for
children.43 The question is, or is supposed to be, whether there is some
logical connection between the alleged similar transaction and the
charged offense so that the similar transaction tends to prove the
defendant committed the charged offense, rather than simply to prove
his bad character. 44 The dissent could not accept that a stale conviction
for sexually assaulting a woman tended to prove the defendant molested
his eleven-year-old stepdaughter.45 Clearly, the fact the defendant was
convicted of a prior sexual assault, regardless of the circumstances of the
assault, would likely prejudice the jury against him.46 The likelihood
of prejudice was particularly acute in Payne, the dissent noted, because
of the scant evidence-other than the victim's changing stories-that the
defendant was guilty of child molestation.4 7
By the end of the survey year, and notwithstanding the court of
appeals effort in Wade and the strong dissent in Payne, the exceptions
to the rule barring extrinsic act evidence remained as broad as ever.
Extrinsic act evidence can also be relevant in civil cases, although
courts are generally much more reluctant to admit extrinsic act evidence
in civil than in criminal cases. Superficially, this reluctance might seem
odd; in criminal cases, in which freedom and potentially lives are at
stake, one might suppose courts would be more circumspect in the
admission of highly prejudicial extrinsic act evidence than in civil cases,
which typically involve only monetary damages. However, upon closer

39. Id. at 140, 674 S.E.2d at 301.
40. Id.
41. 265 Ga. 622, 458 S.E.2d 643 (1995).
42. 285 Ga. at 141, 674 S.E.2d at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Farley, 265 Ga. at 630, 458 S.E.2d at 650 (Sears, J., concurring specially)).
43. Id., 674 S.E.2d at 301.
44. See id. at 142, 674 S.E.2d at 302.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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scrutiny, it is evident why this is the case. Criminal cases typically
involve intentional conduct and thus bring into play issues such as
motive, scheme, identity, or intent. Thus, proof a defendant intentionally committed a similar offense may tend to identify him as the perpetrator of the charged offense, or a similar offense could be probative of a
motive to commit the charged offense. Civil cases, on the other hand,
typically involve issues of negligence or other unintentional acts. As a
result, there are fewer legitimate reasons for the admission of extrinsic
act evidence.
The question in either a civil or criminal case is whether the extrinsic
act evidence is relevant to a legitimate issue in the case.48 While the
issues in play in criminal cases make it more likely that extrinsic act
evidence may be relevant, civil cases can involve such issues as well.
For example, as held during the survey period, evidence in a civil sexual
harassment suit that an employee had sexually harassed others is
admissible to demonstrate that the employer knew or should have
49
known its employee posed a risk of repeating his misconduct.
Similarly, as acknowledged by the court of appeals during the survey
period, in a civil suit against a bar for negligently failing to provide
security, evidence of prior similar criminal activity on the premises can
be admissible to prove the bar had received notice of the need to provide
However, the prior acts must be sufficiently similar."1
security.5"
Thus, the court of appeals held that evidence of criminal activity outside
the bar was irrelevant to the plaintiff's claim that the bar failed to
provide security against criminal activity inside the bar.52
Although the res gestae doctrine is typically thought of as an exception
to the rule against hearsay, it also permits the admission of evidence of
conduct that is not directly related to the transaction at issue but,
nevertheless, has a sufficient temporal connection to the transaction at
issue to be admitted as part of the res gestae.53 The court of appeals
illustrated this point, somewhat humorously, in In re J.W.B.54 In In re
J.W.B. the defendant, a juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent for
certain violent behavior, contended that the trial court erred when it
allowed witnesses to testify that the juvenile "dropped his pants in front

48. See O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 to -2 (1995).
49. Ferman v. Bailey, 292 Ga. App. 288, 290, 664 S.E.2d 285, 287-88 (2008).
50. Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 311, 312, 670 S.E.2d 116, 119 (2008).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 314, 670 S.E.2d at 120.
53. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 57 MERCER L. REV.
187, 190 (2005).
54. 296 Ga. App. 131, 673 S.E.2d 630 (2009).
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of female witnesses" after the altercation giving rise to the delinquency
charges. 5 Not so, the court of appeals held. 6
It is well settled in this state that acts are pertinent as a part of the
res gestae if they are done pending the hostile enterprise, and if they
bear upon it, are performed whilst it is in continuous progress to its
catastrophe, and are of a nature to promote or obstruct, advance or
retard it, or to evince essential motive or purpose in reference to it.5
In other words, dropping trou after a fight is part of the res gestae.5 8
B.

Prejudice Versus Probative Value
Federal Rule of Evidence 403"9 provides the overarching evidentiary
principle that "[allthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.'
Although
Georgia's evidence code 1 does not contain an explicit general balancing
test similar to Rule 403,2 Georgia courts nevertheless sometimes apply
such a test. For example, in Ross v. State," the Georgia Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Old
Chief v. United States,' which limited, in very narrow circumstances,
the generally broad right of the prosecution to present all facts relevant
to the case.6
In Old Chief,the United States Supreme Court, relying on Rule 403,
held that in a firearms possession case it is error for a trial court to
admit evidence of the circumstances and nature of a defendant's prior
felony conviction upon which the firearm charge is based if that evidence
would prejudice the jury." In Ross, which also involved charges of

55. Id. at 132, 673 S.E.2d at 631.
56. Id. at 133, 673 S.E.2d at 632.
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sypho v. State, 175 Ga. App. 833,

834, 334 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1985)).
58. Id.
59. FED. R. EvID. 403.
60. Id.
61. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (1995 & Supp. 2009).
62. See id. However, O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 (Supp. 2009), which governs the use of
convictions to impeach witnesses, incorporates a Rule 403 balancing test. Id.; see also infra
text accompanying notes 130-46.
63. 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). For additional discussion of this case, see Marc
T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 197-98
(2005).

64. 519 U.S. 172 (1997); Ross, 279 Ga. at 368, 614 S.E.2d at 34.
65. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191-92.
66. Id. at 190-92.
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weapon possession by a convicted felon, the Georgia Supreme Court
acknowledged that the State has a broad right to choose the evidence it
wants to present to the jury and that "'a criminal defendant may not
stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as
the [State] chooses to present it.' 67 However, in the very narrow
circumstance when the prosecution simply needs to prove a person's
status as a convicted felon, there is no need for the jury to know the
nature of the felony conviction.6
During the survey period, the defendant in Mims v. State9 attempted
to use Ross and Old Chief to exclude highly prejudicial evidence.7 ° The
defendant, a youth pastor, faced multiple charges arising from his rape
of a minor who participated in his church youth group. Tragically, the
minor became pregnant. After she underwent an abortion, investigators
performed DNA testing on the aborted fetal material, which confirmed
that the defendant impregnated the minor. To avoid the admission of
this evidence, the defendant offered to stipulate that he engaged in sex
with the minor. The defendant argued that this eliminated the need to
admit DNA testing of the fetal material. Since that evidence was
unnecessary, the defendant argued, there was no need for the jury to
know the victim became pregnant and underwent an abortion. The
defendant argued that this fell within the scope of Ross's and Old Chiefs
narrow exception to the broad right of prosecutors to present their case
to the jury as they think best.7' The court of appeals disagreed, noting
that no case had extended Ross beyond the crime of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.72 In short, the court reiterated that
criminal defendants cannot stipulate their way around the admission of
prejudicial evidence outside the exception from Old Chief.73 If the
evidence is relevant to the prosecution's case, the prosecution is entitled
to present that evidence to the jury.74
C.

Relevancy, Generally

For those who primarily represent plaintiffs in tort actions, the
Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia

67. 279 Ga. at 367,614 S.E.2d at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting Old Chief,519 U.S.
at 186-87).

68. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191; Ross, 279 Ga. at 367, 614 S.E.2d at 34.
69.

291 Ga. App. 777, 662 S.E.2d 867 (2008).

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 780-81, 662 S.E.2d at 870-71.
Id. at 777-81, 662 S.E.2d at 868-71.
Id. at 781, 662 S.E.2d at 871.
See id.

74. See id.
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Associates, P.C., holding that a medical malpractice expert's personal
practices are inadmissible,76 and the Georgia General Assembly's
adoption of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,7" including
"super" Daubert requirements for medical malpractice actions,78 are two
of the most troubling developments of the decade.
Given these
developments, some may find it ironic that the Georgia Supreme Court,
relying on section 24-9-67.1 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A )79 -Georgia's Daubert statute-has overruled Johnson.'
In Johnson a divided supreme court held that an expert witness in a
medical negligence case could not be cross-examined about how he
personally would have treated the plaintiff.81 The defendant's expert
in Johnson testified on direct examination that the defendant's conduct
in the care of the plaintiff's wife met the applicable standard of care.
The trial court refused to allow the plaintiff to cross-examine the expert
about how he personally would have treated the decedent. According to
the plaintiff's offer of proof, the expert would have testified that he
personally would have treated the decedent in accordance with the
standard of care advocated by the plaintiff's expert.8 2 According to the
dissent, the plaintiff also wanted to cross-examine the expert about how
83
he taught his medical students to treat patients in similar situations.
A six-justice majority held that the trial court properly limited the
plaintiff's cross-examination of the expert." First, the court held that
the testimony would not be relevant to establish the applicable standard
of care because the standard of care is determined by the degree of care
and skill required of a physician as ordinarily employed by the medical

75. 275 Ga. 240, 563 S.E.2d 431 (2002).
76. Id. at 243, 563 S.E.2d at 434.
77. 509 U.S. 36 (1993).
78. As discussed below and in prior surveys, O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2009) codified
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 36 (1993) and added additional requirements for the admission of expert
testimony in medical malpractice actions. See O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1; Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 135, 157, 160-70 (2008);
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 59 MERCER L. REV. 157, 172
(2007); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 58 MERCER L. REV.
151, 168-69 (2006); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 57
MERCER L. REV. 187, 205 (2005).
79. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2009).
80. See Condra v. At. Orthopaedic Group, P.C., 285 Ga. 667, 669, 681 S.E.2d 152, 154
(2009).

81.
82.
83.
84.

275 Ga. at
Id. at 241,
Id. at 244,
Id. at 242,

242-43, 563 S.E.2d at 433-34.
563 S.E.2d at 432-33.
563 S.E.2d at 435 (Carley, J., dissenting).
563 S.E.2d at 433 (majority opinion).
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profession generally.'
Thus, the majority reasoned, what one doctor
would do in a particular situation is not relevant to establish the
Nor
standard of care required of the medical profession generally.'
was the testimony admissible to impeach the expert; how the expert
would have treated the patient personally was irrelevant to the issue of
the standard of care generally.8 7
Three justices dissented, arguing that the expert's personal practices
were relevant to impeach the expert's testimony concerning the standard
of care." Clearly, the dissent argued, the fact that the expert would
have treated the patient differently than what he contended was the
89
applicable standard of care was admissible to impeach his testimony.
His testimony became particularly important impeachment evidence in
view of the fact, not discussed by the majority, that the expert testified
on direct examination that nothing could have been done to make the
procedure safer for the plaintiff's wife.'
As reported in last year's survey,9 1 the court of appeals in Condra v.
Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, PC.9 2 returned to this issue and rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 effectively overruled
Johnson.93 Specifically, the plaintiffs relied on O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f),
which provides that so "the courts of the State of Georgia not be viewed
as open to expert evidence that would not be admissible in other
states," 4 Georgia courts should draw upon Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.95 and its progeny when applying O.C.G.A. § 27-967.1. 96 The plaintiffs contended that under Daubert analysis, the
expert's personal practices would be relevant to test the reliability of the
expert's opinions. 97 The court of appeals rejected this argument,
reasoning that the Daubert statute applied only "to the threshold
question of whether a proposed expert witness is competent to testify"

85. Id. at 242-43, 563 S.E.2d at 433-34.
86. Id., 563 S.E.2d at 433.
87. Id., 563 S.E.2d at 433-34.
88. Id. at 244, 563 S.E.2d at 434-35 (Carley, J., dissenting).
89. Id., 563 S.E.2d at 435.
90. See id.
91. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.
135, 147 (2008).
92. 292 Ga. App. 276, 664 S.E.2d 281 (2008).
93. Id. at 279, 664 S.E.2d at 283.
94. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f).
95. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
96. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f); Condra, 292 Ga. App. at 278, 664 S.E.2d at 282-83.

97.

Condra, 292 Ga. App. at 278, 664 S.E.2d at 282-83.
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and did not address whether evidence is relevant to the applicable
standard of care.9"
The supreme court granted certiorari to address the question of
whether the trial court properly prohibited plaintiffs "from inquiring at
trial into the personal practices of defendants' expert witnesses with
respect to the medical treatment at issue."" In reversing the court of
appeals, the supreme court's holding was both broad and
clear-"evidence regarding an expert witness' personal practices, unless
subject to exclusion on other evidentiary grounds, is admissible both as
substantive evidence and to impeach the expert's opinion regarding the
applicable standard of care."'0° The court's decision to reverse course
on this issue was predicated primarily on the new Daubert statute,
which places much emphasis on an expert's "'actual professional
knowledge and experience'" based on being "'regularly engaged in ...
ft]he active practice of such area of specialty of his or her profession for
at least three of the last five years, with sufficient frequency to establish
an appropriatelevel of knowledge.'"'1 ' Given this language, the court
held "there can be no dispute as to the relevance, post-Tort Reform
Act,[i. °2] of an expert's personal experience and practice to the threshold inquiry into the expert's qualifications."' ° ' Indeed, "it would defy
logic to find such experience categorically irrelevant in assessing the
credibility of the expert's testimony." °4
In a rather unusual way, the court also relied on the Georgia General
Assembly's "exhortation" that Georgia courts should look to Daubert for
guidance when interpreting Georgia's Daubert statute. 10 5 Specifically,
the supreme court turned to almost forgotten language in Daubert that
emphasized the importance of cross-examination, rather than judicial
gatekeeping, in determining the reliability and credibility of expert
testimony.'°6 That this portion of Daubert is less well-known is
understandable. When the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit first looked at Daubert in Joiner v. General Electric
Co.,107 it looked at this same language and read Daubert to mean that

98. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 283.
99. Condra, 285 Ga. at 667, 681 S.E.2d at 152.
100. Id. at 669, 681 S.E.2d at 154.
101. Id. at 669-70, 681 S.E.2d at 154 (alteration in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-967. 1(c)(2)(A)).
102. 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the O.C.G.A.).
103. Condra, 285 Ga. at 670, 681 S.E.2d at 154.
104. Id.
105. Id., 681 S.E.2d at 155.
106. Id. at 671, 681 S.E.2d at 155 (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 589-97).
107. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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it was no longer necessary for expert evidence to satisfy the burdensome
general acceptance test; rather, it would be sufficient if the evidence was
"scientifically legitimate, and not 'junk science' or mere speculation."" 8
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Daubertmeant that judges were not
to assume the role of juries and weigh facts." ° This initial reading of
Daubert was perhaps understandable. After all, it was in Daubert that
the United States Supreme Court rejected pharmaceutical industry
*concerns that the abandonment of the general acceptance test would
open the door to junk science:
In this regard respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about
the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally.
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence ....

These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion under an
uncompromising "general acceptance" test, are the appropriate
safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards
of Rule 702.110

Of course, as we know now, Daubert was intended to do anything but
lower the threshold for admissibility of expert opinion, and the Supreme
Court reversed Joiner."'
Thus, it is interesting that in response to the General Assembly's
exhortation to draw from Daubert, the Georgia Supreme Court turned
to Daubert'semphasis on the right and effectiveness of cross-examination: "'The right of... cross-examination ...

is a substantial right, the

preservation of which is essential to [a] proper administration of justice,
and extends to all matters within the knowledge of the witness, the
disclosure of which is material to the controversy.'"1"2 Now it seems
the question is whether the Georgia Supreme Court has signaled an
intent to follow Daubert's view on cross-examination as the more
effective method to scuttle junk science, rather than Daubert'semphasis
on the role of the judicial gatekeeper.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 530.
Id.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997).
Condra, 285 Ga. at 671,681 S.E.2d at 155 (first and second alterations in original)

(quoting News Publ'g Co. v. Butler, 95 Ga. 559, 559, 22 S.E. 282, 282 (1895)).
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IV. WITNESSES

Examination and Impeachment of Witnesses Generally
The testimony of one witness bolstering the testimony or credibility of
another witness is generally admissible." 3 Perhaps the most notable
exception, which is discussed below, is the admission of prior consistent
statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication.' 14 Otherwise,
Georgia courts frown heavily on bolstering testimony, and during the
survey period, the court of appeals again made this clear. In Walker v.
State," ' the trial court permitted a witness in the defendant's trial for
child molestation to testify that the victim told her what happened." 6
As the victim gave her account, the witness testified she thought: "'And
I'm looking at her and I know her. I'm like now this child is telling me
the truth.'""" The defendant's trial counsel did not object to this
testimony, but on appeal, the defendant contended that the testimony
was inadmissible and that the failure of his trial counsel to object
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 18 The court of appeals
agreed." 9 It is well-established, the court held, that the credibility of
the witness is always a matter for the jury's determination, and a
witness's testimony cannot be bolstered by the opinion of another expert
truth. 2 Accordingly, the court reversed
that the witness has told the
12 1

A.

the defendant's conviction.

Bolstering can take many forms, as illustrated by the court of appeals
opinion in the rather unusual case of Axelburg v. State.2 2 In Axelburg
the defendant was charged with molesting the sixteen-year-old
babysitter of his children. The babysitter reported that she woke to
discover the defendant lying beside her with his fingers in her vagina.
The defendant claimed that he was sleepwalking at the time of the
incident, if in fact it happened, and thus, he lacked the intent necessary
to commit the crime of molestation. When the defendant learned of the

113. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 48 MERCER
L. REV. 323, 342-43 (1996).

114. See infra text accompanying notes 151-55.
115.

296 Ga. App. 531, 675 S.E.2d 270 (2009).

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 534, 675 S.E.2d at 273.
Id.
Id. at 534-35, 675 S.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 535, 675 S.E.2d at 273.
Id.
Id.
294 Ga. App. 612, 669 S.E.2d 439 (2008).
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babysitter's accusations, he and his wife went to the sheriff's office and
voluntarily submitted to an interrogation. During the course of that
interrogation, the defendant, although still claiming he was sleepwalking, admitted that he awoke and found himself standing over the
babysitter with his hand inside her. During the lengthy interrogation,
the defendant provided many more details about what he remembered
and his sleepwalking condition. At his trial, the court admitted the
entire videotape of the interrogation, including the questions and
comments of the interrogator.1 23 Typically, an interrogator's questions
in the interview are admissible, even though they may be hearsay, 1to
24
put into context the answers given by the person being interrogated.
In Axelburg, however, the interrogator did much more than merely ask
questions. He claimed to be a former sleepwalker himself, and
repeatedly accused the defendant of lying, stating that he was a certified
forensic interviewer and could tell with some expertise that the
defendant was lying.1 25 In effect, the interrogator was offering a
purported expert opinion on the defendant's sleepwalking defense and
his credibility.126 Because the defendant's credibility and the resolution of conflicting expert testimony about sleepwalking were the key
issues in the case, the interrogator's statements impermissibly bolstered
the testimony of prosecution experts and invaded the province of the
jury, which alone can determine witness credibility.'2 7 Accordingly,
to
the court of appeals agreed that the trial court erred when it failed
128
video.
the
from
comments
inadmissible
interrogator's
redact the
Impeachment with Evidence of Convictions
Among other things, the Criminal Justice Act of 2005129 enacted
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1,3° which largely, but not completely, adopts
Federal Rule of Evidence 60913' regarding the use of convictions to
impeach witnesses. 3 2 Like Rule 609, O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 incorporates a Federal Rule of Evidence 403133 balancing test as a prerequisite

B.

123.
124.
L. REV.
125.
126.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 612-13, 669 S.E.2d at 441.
See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 48 MERCER
323, 347-50 (1996).
Axelburg, 294 Ga. App. at 616, 669 S.E.2d at 443.
Id. at 618, 669 S.E.2d at 445.

Id.
Id. at 615-16, 669 S.E.2d at 443.
2005 Ga. Laws 20.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 (Supp. 2009).
FED. R. EVID. 609.
See O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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to admitting convictions to impeach witnesses.1 34 Under O.C.G.A.
§ 24-9-84.1, a witness other than a criminal defendant can be impeached
with evidence of a conviction punishable by death or imprisonment of
one year or more (essentially a felony) if the "probative value of
admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the witness."135 A criminal defendant can be impeached with evidence of such
a crime only if the probative value of the conviction "substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant."136 Although this
balancing requirement is fairly straightforward, it markedly departs
from prior Georgia law, which essentially permitted the use of any felony
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude to impeach a witness.1 3 7
The court of appeals opinion in Whatley v. State13 sends a clear
message to judges and lawyers slow to recognize the new requirements
of O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1.
In Whatley the prosecution repeatedly
impeached the defendant's witnesses with evidence of their prior
convictions over the repeated objections from the defendant's attorney
that the court had not engaged in the new balancing test.139 In
response to these objections, the trial judge informed defense counsel
that her objection was not valid and that the relevant inquiry is merely
whether "'the offenses involve moral turpitude,'"14 ' clearly indicating
that the judge was not quite current on the law. The court of appeals
agreed that the trial court erred when it "expressly refuse[d]" to engage
in the required balancing test.141
Similarly, the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction in
Abercrombie v. State14 2 because the trial court, when it admitted the
defendant's 1998 conviction for entering an automobile, did not make
express findings to support its conclusion that the probative value of the
defendant's prior conviction substantially outweighed its prejudicial
effect.1 43 In making this determination, the trial court should consider
"'the kind of felony involved, the date of the conviction, and the
importance of the witness's credibility.'"144 In Abercrombie the trial

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(1), (3).
Id. § 24-9-84.1(aX).
Id. § 24-9-84.1(a)(2).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84 (1995), amended by 2005 Ga. Laws 20, 27-29.
296 Ga. App. 72, 673 S.E.2d 510 (2009).
Id. at 73-74, 673 S.E.2d at 511.
Id. at 74, 673 S.E.2d at 512.
Id.
297 Ga. App. 522, 677 S.E.2d 719 (2009).
Id. at 523-24, 677 S.E.2d at 720-21.

144. Id. at 524, 677 S.E.2d at 721 (quoting Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga. App. 423, 428, 662
S.E.2d 235, 240 (2008)).
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court concluded that the prior conviction was admissible simply because
it had probative value.' 45 The court of appeals held that the trial court
was not authorized to determine the admissibility of a prior conviction
by any standard other than O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(2), which requires a
determination that the probative value of the conviction
substantially
146
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.
C.

PriorStatements by Witnesses
Georgia has two rather unique rules regarding the admissibility of
prior statements by witnesses, rules that implicate both impeachment
and hearsay principles. First, in Gibbons v. State,147 the Georgia
Supreme Court held that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are
admissible as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to crossexamination.'"
Second, pursuant to Cuzzort v. State,'149 a prior
consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence if the witness
is present at trial and subject to cross-examination. 5 ° However, the
supreme court significantly limited Cuzzort in Woodard v. State,'51
holding that prior consistent statements are admissible only when the
veracity of the witness who made the statement has been placed at
issue. 5 2 In Woodard the supreme court concluded that Cuzzort was
"improperly construed to permit the admission per se of a witness's prior
consistent statement-regardless of whether the witness's veracity
actually has been called into question during cross-examination."' 5 3
Instead, the court continued, prior consistent statements "are admissible
only where (1) the veracity of a witness's trial testimony has been placed
in issue at trial; (2) the witness is present at trial; and (3) the witness
is available for cross-examination.""
"Even then, the prior consistent
statement may be admitted as nonhearsay only if it was made before the
motive or influence came into existence or before the time of the alleged
recent fabrication."' 55

145. Id.
146. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(2).
147. 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982).
148. Id. at 863, 286 S.E.2d at 721-22.
149. 254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985).
150. Id. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 662.
151. 269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998).
152. Id. at 319-20, 496 S.E.2d at 899.
153. Id. at 320 n.14, 496 S.E.2d at 899 n.14.
154. Id. at 320, 496 S.E.2d at 899 (citing Robertson v. State, 268 Ga. 772, 777, 493
S.E.2d 697, 703 (1997)).
155. Phillips v. State, 241 Ga. App. 764, 766, 527 S.E.2d 604, 607 (2000), discussed in
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 52 MERCER L. REV. 263,
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Although the appellate courts have not been entirely consistent in
their application of Woodard,1" they clearly sent the message to
prosecutors and trial judges during the survey period that Woodard
means exactly what it says. For example, in Cash V. State,l s 7 the
Georgia Court of Appeals summarily reversed the defendant's conviction
for aggravated child molestation, something appellate courts rarely
do."s In Cash the trial court admitted, pursuant to the child hearsay
5 9
statute,"
the victim's out-of-court statements that bolstered the
alleged victim's somewhat incomplete trial testimony. On appeal, the
defendant contended that the victim's prior statements were not
admissible because the victim was fifteen years old at the time of the
alleged molestation, and the child hearsay statute applies only to
statements by victims who are younger than fifteen. The prosecution,
apparently acknowledging that the statement did not meet the
requirements of the child hearsay statute, argued on appeal that the
statements were nevertheless admissible as prior consistent statements
pursuant to Woodard because the defendant attacked the victim's
credibility in his opening statement by alleging that the victim's father
prompted her to fabricate her allegations. However, the defendant's
claim of fabrication was based on animosity arising from a custody
dispute between the defendant and the victim's sister, who had been
married to the defendant. This custody dispute began before the alleged
molestation, and thus, the victim's prior consistent statements were not
made prior to the time the motive to fabricate arose.'60 The court of
appeals agreed; the victim's pretrial statements were nothing more than
the victim's story, and the court reversed
hearsay introduced to bolster
161
the defendant's conviction.
Similarly, relying on Woodard, the supreme court held in Duggan v.
State 62 that the trial court erroneously admitted a witness's prior
In
consistent statement during the defendant's trial for murder."6
Duggan the trial court admitted as substantive evidence a pretrial
statement made to police on the night of the crime from a witness
related to the victim. There was no evidence to suggest this statement

295-96 (2000).

156. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 60 MERCER L.
REV. 135, 148-50 (2008).
157. 294 Ga. App. 741, 669 S.E.2d 731 (2008).
158. Id. at 746-47, 669 S.E.2d at 735.
159. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
160. Cash, 294 Ga. App. at 742-45, 669 S.E.2d at 732-34.
161. Id. at 746-47, 669 S.E.2d at 735.
162. 285 Ga. 363, 677 S.E.2d 92 (2009).
163. Id. at 366, 677 S.E.2d at 94.
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was made prior to any motive to fabricate; on the contrary, the
64
statement was made after the death of the victim's stepbrother.'
Accordingly, the supreme court easily concluded that the admission of
the statement was error.165 However, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the error was harmless. 166
Both Gibbons and Cuzzort require that the declarant be available for
cross-examination. 6 ' During the survey period, the supreme court
addressed this requirement in a rather unusual context. In Soto v.
State," the State called as a witness the defendant's alleged codefendant, who had entered a guilty plea prior to trial. The codefendant testified that although the defendant had been with him, the
defendant waited nearby while he alone killed the victim. The testimony
was inconsistent with his prior statements implicating the defendant.
Then the co-defendant abruptly refused to testify any further. The trial
court allowed the State to impeach the co-defendant with testimony from
a police officer and a fellow prisoner recounting the statements made to
them by the co-defendant. 6 9 The supreme court easily concluded that
the statement to the police officer was testimonial and therefore
inadmissible pursuant to Crawford v. Washington.7 ° Regarding the
prisoner's testimony, the prosecution contended that the co-defendant's
statements were admissible as prior inconsistent statements. The
defendant, however, argued that the co-defendant's prior inconsistent
statements were not admissible because the co-defendant was not
available for cross-examination. 1 ' This presented the supreme court
with a difficult question: When, on direct examination, a witness gives
testimony that exonerates a defendant, can the State introduce
contradictory out-of-court statements to impeach him, when the

164. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 94-95.
165. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 95.
166. Id.; see also Connelly v. State, 295 Ga. App. 765, 768, 673 S.E.2d 274, 277 (2009)
(holding that the trial court erroneously, but harmlessly, admitted a prior consistent
statement because the statement was made after the alleged motive to give false testimony
arose).
167. Cuzzort, 254 Ga. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 662; Gibbons, 248 Ga. at 863, 286 S.E.2d
at 721-22; Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L.
REV. 135, 147-48 (2008).
168. 285 Ga. 367, 677 S.E.2d 95 (2009).
169. Id. at 368, 677 S.E.2d at 97-98.
170. 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Soto, 285 Ga. at 369, 677 S.E.2d at 98. For further discussion
of Crawford, see infra text accompanying notes 235-45.
171. Soto, 285 Ga. at 370, 677 S.E.2d at 98-99.
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statements inculpate the defendant and the witness refuses to answer
further questions posed by either the State or the defendant?'
The supreme court previously addressed a similar, but not identical,
question in Barksdale v. State.'73 In Barksdale the supreme court held
that the trial court erred when, in reliance on Gibbons and Cuzzort, it
permitted the prosecution to play the videotaped testimony of a codefendant incriminating the defendant after the co-defendant refused to
testify, claiming that the co-defendant feared retribution.1 74 The court
held that the co-defendant's refusal to testify meant there was no trial
testimony--consistent or inconsistent-with the pretrial statement. 175
Consequently, the witness's prior statement could not be permitted as
a prior inconsistent statement.1 76 In Soto the prosecution argued that
Barksdale did not bar the admission of the statement because the codefendant testified, to a point, at trial. 7 7 Acknowledging Barksdale
was not entirely on point, the court noted that Barksdale nevertheless
reinforced the principle that prior inconsistent statements are not
admissible if the defendant did not have an opportunity for effective
cross-examination. 17
In Soto, once the witness ceased testifying
during his direct examination, he was unavailable for cross-examination,
79
and therefore the admission of the prior statement was error.1
V. EXPERT WITNESSES
As discussed in the previous four editions of the Annual Survey of
Georgia Law,'8° in 2005 the General Assembly, as a part of tort reform
legislation,' enacted O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.11s2 to adopt, more or less,
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,"a which in turn has been codified as Federal

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 369, 677 S.E.2d at 98.
265 Ga. 9, 453 S.E.2d 2 (1995).
Id. at 10-11, 453 S.E.2d at 3-4.
Id. at 11, 453 S.E.2d at 4.

176.

Id.

177. 285 Ga. at 370, 677 S.E.2d at 98-99.
178. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 99.
179. Id.
180. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.
135, 156 (2008); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59 MERCER
L. REV. 157, 172 (2007); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 58
MERCER L. REV. 151, 165 (2006); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 205 (2005).
181. 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the O.C.G.A.).
182. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2009).
183. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Rule of Evidence 702. l ' The "more or less" is significant. On the
"less" side, the General Assembly, for reasons unstated (but likely
having more to do with politics than anything else), exempted criminal
cases from the new Daubert statuteM and then exempted most
condemnation cases from the statute in the 2006 session."
On the
"more" side, the General Assembly adopted "super Daubert"
5 7
rules for
professional negligence cases, particularly medical negligence cases."'8
As discussed in previous surveys"89 and this year below, the super
Daubert rules primarily implemented a "three of five" rule, requiring
that experts in medical negligence cases have requisite and certain
experience within three of the five years preceding the date of the
incident at issue." Perhaps the most significant Daubert case during
the survey year was Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, RC., 9'
discussed above. 192 In Condra the Georgia Supreme Court held that
the new Daubert statute effectively overruled case law that said the
personal practices of an expert were irrelevant in medical negligence
cases. 93 In the process, Condra perhaps reinvigorated language in
Daubert emphasizing the crucial role of cross-examination in the
19 4
determination of the the credibility and reliability of experts.
However, the court of appeals decision in Hamilton-King v. HNTB
Georgia, Inc."19 also goes to the heart of the ongoing Daubert debate-just how far can the trial court go in excluding expert testimony
before it invades the province of the jury? In Hamilton-King the
plaintiffs brought suit against a general contractor and construction
designer, alleging negligence in the design and construction of a roadwidening project on Interstate 95 in southern Georgia. To support their
claims, the plaintiffs relied on a civil engineer who expressed various
opinions with regard to the flow of traffic over a 900-foot bridge that was

184.

FED. R. EVID. 702.

185. See 2005 Ga. Laws at 8 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(a)).
186.

2006 Ga. Laws 39, 47 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 22-1-14(b) (Supp. 2009)).

187. "Super Daubert"is not a technical term, but seems to have become the preferred
short hand reference for Georgia attorneys for the additional requirements imposed by
Georgia's Daubert statute.
188. 2005 Ga. Laws at 8-9 (codified as amended at O.C.GA. § 24-9-67.1(b)-(c)).
189. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.

135, 162-64 (2008); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59
MERCER L. REV. 157, 175-77 (2007).
190. See O.C.GA. § 24-9-67.1(c)(2)(A)-(D).

191.

285 Ga. 667, 681 S.E.2d 152 (2009).

192.

See supra text accompanying notes 92-112.

193.

285 Ga. at 669-70, 681 S.E.2d at 154.

194.

See id. at 671, 681 S.E.2d at 155.

195.

296 Ga. App. 864, 676 S.E.2d 287 (2009).
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under construction. Primarily, the expert opined there were insufficient
shoulders and lighting to provide refuge for motorists whose vehicles
became disabled on the bridge. Had the project been properly designed
and implemented, the expert testified, the collision that resulted in the
death and injuries of the plaintiffs and their decedents would never have
happened. The defendants moved to exclude the expert's testimony,
claiming that he was not qualified to render opinions because he lacked
experience in designing or reviewing traffic control patterns. Further,
they contended that his opinions were unreliable because they were not
based on industry standards or publications." 9 Although the trial
court found the expert was qualified to testify about traffic control
measures, the court concluded that his opinions were not properly
supported by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, 197 the
standard industry manual. Moreover, because there were no prior
similar incidents, the trial court concluded that the expert's opinions
were not properly tested and that there was no evidence to show his
opinions were generally accepted.' 98 Pulling straight from traditional
Daubert analysis,
the trial court concluded that the opinions of Mr. Thomas, which he
concedes to be products of his exercise of "engineering judgment" and
which, under the evidence presented, cannot be validated against
accepted standards, tested, or reviewed, are not reliable, as that term
is used in [O.C.G.A.] § 24-9-67.1(b)(2) and (3), and they are therefore
inadmissible.'99
The court of appeals addressed each of the bases for the trial court's
conclusion. First, although it was true that the expert did not point to
a specific provision of the industry standards manual, his opinions were
based on his engineering judgment as shaped by the manual. 20° The
manual itself notes that it is not a substitute for engineering judgment,
nor is the
manual the sole source of engineering and design stan1
dards.

20

The court of appeals also rejected the trial court's conclusion that the
expert's opinions could not be validated because there were no prior

196. Id. at 864-65, 676 S.E.2d at 288-89.
197. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP., MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC
CONTROL DEVICES (2003 ed., rev. Dec. 2007), available at http'/mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs
/2003rlr2/mutcd2003rlr2complet.pdf.
198. Hamilton-King, 296 Ga. App. at 864-66, 676 S.E.2d at 289.
199. Id. at 866, 676 S.E.2d at 289.
200. Id. at 867, 676 S.E.2d at 290.
201. Id. at 867-68,676 S.E.2d at 290; FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., supra note 197, § 1A.09.
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similar incidents.2"2 The court noted that the trial court apparently
relied on the suggestion 20 3 in O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f) that Georgia
courts draw from Daubert and its progeny and, thus, applied the
standard Daubert analysis found in federal court decisions.2"4 Specifically, the trial court considered whether the theory or technique at issue
could be and had been tested, whether it had been subjected to peer
review and publication, whether its potential rate of error was acceptable, and whether it had been generally accepted in the community.2 5
Because the General Assembly only suggested and did not command
Georgia courts to follow Daubert and because even federal courts
recognize the flexibility of Daubert analysis, the court concluded that
"while the Daubert factors may bear on a judge's determination
regarding the admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony, those
factors 'may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending
on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the
subject of his testimony.'" 2 6 This flexible approach to Daubert analy-

sis led the court of appeals to reject the trial court's rigid conclusion that
the expert testimony had not been properly tested, stating "we cannot
require evidence of numerous fatal car accidents on this highway before
allowing an expert to testify about safety measures that could have been
implemented to prevent the first such

injury."2 0 7

The court of appeals

also rejected the trial court's conclusion that the expert's theories were
inadmissible because there was no demonstrated error rate, holding
that
20 8
"this 'failure' [was not] sufficient to exclude Thomas's testimony."
The court of appeals decision in CSX Transportation,Inc. v. McDowell20 9 may come as a relief to trial court judges who, perhaps
unlike their federal counterparts, lack the time and resources to engage
in lengthy Daubert hearings and analysis. In McDowell the defendant
argued that the trial court erred when it denied its Daubert motion
because "the trial court failed to expressly demonstrate that it carried

202. Hamilton-King, 296 Ga. App. at 868-69, 676 S.E.2d at 291.
203. Note that in Hamilton-King,the court of appeals viewed O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f)
to be a "suggestion," 296 Ga. App. at 868, 676 S.E.2d at 290, while the supreme court

viewed the same language to be an "exhortation" in Condra, 285 Ga. at 670, 681 S.E.2d at
155.
204. Hamilton-King, 296 Ga. App. at 868, 676 S.E.2d at 290.
205. Id.

206. Id., 676 S.E.2d at 290-91 (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
138 (1999)).

207. Id., 676 S.E.2d at 291.
208. Id. at 868-69, 676 S.E.2d at 291.

209. 294 Ga. App. 871, 670 S.E.2d 543 (2008).
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out its role as gatekeeper."2 1 ° The court of appeals easily rejected this
contention, noting that O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 does not require a trial
court to put on the record the bases for its gatekeeping decision, and the
court of appeals saw no reason to impose such a requirement.2 ' A
trial court, the court of appeals noted, is generally presumed to have
performed its duties and, "[aiccordingly, we will presume that, when
presented with a motion to exclude expert testimony as inadmissible
under [O.C.G.A.] § 24-9-67.1, a212trial court engages in the contemplated
analysis in ruling thereupon."

Notwithstanding the court's approval of flexible analysis in HamiltonKing, the formalistic application of the super Daubert requirements
continued during the survey period, and as in previous years,213 the
super Daubert requirements were problematic for plaintiffs in medical
negligence actions. For example, in Dawson v. Leder,214 the court of
appeals held that the trial court properly excluded the testimony of the
plaintiff's trauma and critical care expert because the issue in the case
did not involve critical care medicine generally but instead specifically
involved management of compromised airways in post-surgical patients. 215 Notwithstanding the expert's general experience, the court
noted the admission by the expert that "she had never managed the
airway of a patient who had undergone a surgery similar to that which
the decedent had undergone, nor had she performed a similar surgical
procedure."2" 6 Moreover, the expert acknowledged that post-surgical
airway maintenance is generally handled by anesthesiologists and that
she did not have anesthesiology training. 217 Accordingly, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's218 determination that the plaintiff's
expert was not qualified to testify.

Although most, and perhaps all, medical negligence Daubertappellate
cases have involved physicians, the super Daubert requirements do not
apply to physicians only. Rather, they apply to all medical negligence
cases, and nursing negligence usually falls within the confines of

L.

210.

Id. at 872, 670 S.E.2d at 545.

211.
212.
213.

Id. at 872-73, 670 S.E.2d at 545.
Id. at 873, 670 S.E.2d at 545.
See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 60 MERCER

REV. 135, 160-70 (2008).

214. 294 Ga. App. 717, 669 S.E.2d 720 (2008).
215. Id. at 719-20, 669 S.E.2d at 723.
216. Id. at 720, 669 S.E.2d at 723.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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"medical malpractice."2 19 In Houston v. Phoebe Putney Memorial
Hospital, Inc.,22o a trial court struck the affidavit of the plaintiff's
nurse expert, concluding that it was insufficient under O.C.G.A. § 9-119.1,221 which requires the plaintiff to attach the affidavit of an expert
who meets the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 to his complaint.222 In Houston the plaintiff's expert opined in her affidavit that
the hospital triage nurse breached the standard of care "by not
accurately triaging Mr. Houston and not assuring that he was seen by
a physician in a timely manner."2" As it turned out, the plaintiff was
experiencing a stroke, and he contended that he suffered significantly
more harm than he would if he had been timely treated. 2 The trial
court, without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing and based simply on
the complaint and the affidavit, struck the affidavit, finding that the
plaintiff's expert "was not competent to testify because her affidavit and
curriculum vitae reflected that she had no experience working as a
triage nurse in an emergency room."2" The court of appeals reversed.'
The court of appeals first noted the significance of the posture of the
case at the time of the court's ruling.22 7 Because O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1
is simply an initial pleading requirement, and an affidavit filed pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 must be construed most favorably to the plaintiff,
any doubts must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.2" Even conclusory statements in the affidavit about the expert's qualifications can be
sufficient to establish the expert's competency.' 2 Given this standard,
the court easily concluded that the expert's statements that she was
qualified to express the opinions in her affidavit and that she had
experience triaging patients, although conclusory, were sufficient to meet
the requirements of O.C.G.A § 9-11-9.1. 3 Moreover, the fact that she

219. The Daubert statute does not define medical malpractice, but every other
definition of medical malpracticein the O.C.GA includes nursing negligence. See O.C.GA_
§ 9-3-70 (2007); O.C.G-A § 9-9-60 (2007); O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8 (2006). But see O.C.GA § 33-327 (2000).
220. 295 Ga. App. 674, 673 S.E.2d 54 (2009).
221. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2006 & Supp. 2009); Houston, 295 Ga. App. at 675-76, 673
S.E.2d at 56.
222. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a).
223. 295 Ga. App. at 675, 673 S.E.2d at 56.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 676, 673 S.E.2d at 56.
226. Id. at 680, 673 S.E.2d at 59.
227. Id. at 677, 673 S.E.2d at 57.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 678-79, 673 S.E.2d at 58.
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did not work as a triage nurse in an emergency room was not dispositive." 1 The court said it is not necessary that the expert have experience "'in the same area of practice/specialty as the defendant[.J ' " 32
According to the court, the relevant area of nursing practice was not the
triage of patients in emergency rooms, but rather the assessment and
triage of acute patients, and the plaintiff's expert established experience
in this area.'
Accordingly, and again emphasizing the "early point
in the proceedings," the court held that the plaintiff's expert met the
requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1. 2VI.

HEARSAY

Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation
It has been almost five years since the United States Supreme Court
in Crawford v. Washington2 5 altered the playing field with regard to
the use of hearsay in criminal cases. In Crawford the defendant
contended that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to hear his
wife's tape-recorded statement to police officers. The prosecution
tendered this evidence after the defendant's wife invoked her spousal
privilege and thus was unavailable to testify. 6 The trial court and
the Washington Supreme Court held that the circumstances of the
statement were sufficiently reliable to overcome the defendant's
argument that admitting the out-of-court statement violated his Sixth
Amendmente 7 right of confrontation. 23 The prosecutors argued that
since the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts,239 courts had
allowed the admission of hearsay statements if the statements fell
within a "'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or bear 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.'"2' ° As discussed in many prior surveys, this bypass around the Sixth Amendment became known in
Georgia as the "necessity" exception to the hearsay rule. 1 To exag-

A.

231.
232.
S.E.2d
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 679, 673 S.E.2d at 58.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nathans v. Diamond, 282 Ga. 804, 806, 654
121, 123 (2007)).
Id.
Id. at 679-80, 673 S.E.2d at 58-59.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 40.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
E.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 48 MERCER L.

REV. 323, 351, 354 (1996).
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gerate only a bit, the rapid expansion of the necessity exception seemed
on the verge of supplanting live testimony entirely. 2
In Crawford, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth
Amendment's right of confrontation is not limited to in-court testimony
but also applies to out-of-court "testimonial" statements."'3 Testimonial statements include affidavits, prior testimony, custodial examinations,
and "similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect
to be used prosecutorially."2" Thus, a testimonial out-of-court statement is no longer admissible if the defendant has not had an opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant."4
Previous surveys have questioned whether the res gestae exception
can be used to circumvent Crawford." As Judge Ruffin put it, the res
gestae exception is the "grand octopus of the law, which stretches its
clinging tentacles to anything and everything a party says during the
commission of an act, or so near thereto [and] has been both a reliable
and unreliable exception to the hearsay rule."247 Justice Weltner also
had a colorful description of the res gestae doctrine:
Res gestae is a Gordian Knot, which no one has succeeded in
untying. Lacking an Alexander, it remains as yet unsevered.
This brief survey should be sufficient to demonstrate the futility of
attempting now still another definition, for like Joel Chandler
Harris'[s] tar baby, striking another blow means getting stuck another
time!'
As discussed in last year's survey,249 the question of whether the res
gestae doctrine trumps Crawford was addressed, in an odd sort of way,
in Cuyuch v. State2 "° by the court of appeals, and then by the supreme
court's decision reversing the court of appeals." 1 What the Author
described as odd was the fact that the court of appeals majority opinion

242. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.
135, 174-75 (2008); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59
MERCER L. REV. 157, 181-82 (2007); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 56 MERCER L. REV. 235, 247-48 (2004).
243. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51, 68-69.
244. Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).

245. Id. at 68.
246.

E.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 57 MERCER L.

REV. 187, 215 (2005).

247. White v. State, 265 Ga. App. 117, 117, 592 S.E.2d 905, 906 (2004).
248. Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 227, 290 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1982).
249. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.
135, 180-82 (2008).
250. 286 Ga. App. 629, 649 S.E.2d 856 (2007).
251. Cuyuch v. State, 284 Ga. 290, 290, 667 S.E.2d 85, 87 (2008).
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relied on the res gestae doctrine to admit what appeared to be a
testimonial statement, but the court of appeals never once mentioned
Crawford;and the unanimous supreme court decision reversing the court
of appeals never once mentioned the res gestae doctrine.2 52 Thus, at
the end of the last survey period the question remained: Does the res
gestae doctrine trump Crawford?
The answer, perhaps, came during the current survey period in
Thomas v. State.' In Thomas the defendant contended that the trial
court violated Crawford when it admitted the hearsay statements of
various witnesses who implicated the defendant in the death of his
former wife."M First, a neighbor, noting the victim's car parked askew
with the victim inside, asked the victim what had happened. The victim
responded that her ex-husband shot her. Other neighbors soon arrived,
and they also began questioning the victim and providing the victim's
answers, which incriminated the defendant, to a 911 operator.
Eventually, a deputy sheriff arrived, and the victim also told him that
her ex-husband shot her. Still later, the victim told emergency medical
personnel that her ex-husband shot her.'
The principal issue before
26
the supreme court was whether the statements were testimonial.
The question of whether 911 calls and similar statements made during
the course of an emergency are testimonial was discussed in previous
surveys.'"
Generally, statements made during the course of an
emergency, even if made to police officers, are not testimonial."5 Such
statements are not made to establish or prove a past fact but rather to
convey information in circumstances requiring police assistance.259 In
Thomas the supreme court easily concluded that the statements were
not testimonial in nature.26 ° It was at that point the court shed some
light on whether the res gestae doctrine trumps Crawford. Having
determined the statements in question were non-testimonial, the court
noted that traditional rules of evidence must be considered. 26 ' Because

252. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.
135, 180 (2008).
253. 284 Ga. 540, 668 S.E.2d 711 (2008).
254. Id. at 542, 668 S.E.2d at 714.
255. Id. at 541, 668 S.E.2d at 713.
256. See id. at 542-43, 668 S.E.2d at 714-15.
257. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.
135, 177-79 (2008); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59
MERCER L. REV. 157, 183-84 (2007).
258. See, e.g., Thomas, 284 Ga. at 543, 668 S.E.2d at 714.
259. Id.
260. Id., 668 S.E.2d 715.
261. Id. at 543-44, 668 S.E.2d 715.
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the statements were hearsay, they were admissible only if they fell
within an exception to the hearsay rule.262 In Thomas the court found
such an exception-the res gestae doctrine. 2' Thus, it seems implicit
in Thomas that the res gestae doctrine does not permit the admission of
testimonial hearsay statements in criminal cases. Like almost all
exceptions to the hearsay rule, it is subject to a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.' Accordingly, statements that fall within the res gestae doctrine may be less likely
to be testimonial by their very nature, but if they are in fact testimonial,
Crawford bars their admission.
The extent to which experts can rely on hearsay to reach their
opinions has been a recurring issue in Georgia. The courts have
increasingly allowed experts to base their opinions on hearsay, particularly since the enactment of Georgia's Daubert statute,265 which
specifically allows this practice.2" As it was bound to do, this issue
arose during the survey period in the context of a criminal case in which
an expert relied on the results of laboratory tests performed by someone
other than the testifying expert. In Dunn v. State, 7 the defendant
contended that the trial court improperly allowed a laboratory supervisor
to testify that a white substance found in the defendant's possession
contained methamphetamines. However, the supervisor did not actually
perform the test establishing the composition of the substance. Rather,
the actual testing was done by a technician. The prosecution contended
that the supervisor's testimony was admissible because the supervisor
reviewed the data from the testing and came to an independent
conclusion that the substance contained methamphetamines. 2

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Crawford, 641 U.S. at 53-54. In Crawford the Supreme Court held that common
law exceptions to the right of confrontation existing at the time of the framing of the
Constitution remain exceptions to the Sixth Amendment. Id.

The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions
from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts. Rather, the
"right ...

to be confronted with the witnesses against him," Amdt. 6, is most

naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law,
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.
Id. at 54.
265. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2009).
266. Id.; Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L.
REV. 135, 158 (2008); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 58
MERCER L. REv. 151, 168 (2006).

267. 292 Ga. App. 667, 665 S.E.2d 377 (2008).
268. Id. at 667-69, 665 S.E.2d at 378-79.
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The court of appeals noted that courts across the country have
struggled with this issue since the Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford.269 Some courts have found that laboratory reports are
essentially business or public records, and their admission does not
impinge the right of confrontation.270 Other courts have reached an
opposite conclusion, ruling that a laboratory technician's test results are
testimonial and thus inadmissible.271 A third group of courts followed
the reasoning of decisions holding that 911 calls are non-testimonial
because they are "'a contemporaneous recordation of observable events
rather than the documentation of past events'" and, thus, do not run
afoul of Crawford.272
In Dunn the laboratory technician's report of his conclusions was not
submitted to the jury, and according to the court of appeals, the State
conceded that the admission of the report would have violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.273 However, the court of appeals
reasoned that the supervisor's testimony was properly admitted because
she "came to her own independent conclusion that the substance was
methamphetamine based on the chemical 'fingerprint' from the GCMS
test. " 274 The court then noted the evolving Georgia authority allowing
experts to base their opinions on hearsay.275 True enough, but this
seemed to miss the defendant's point. The question was not whether the
test results were hearsay and admissible pursuant to an exception
allowing an expert to rely on hearsay, but whether they were testimonial
statements that violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights when
admitted.
Although not entirely clear, the court's opinion suggests that it was
persuaded by the reasoning of the 911 cases and that routine laboratory
test results and conclusions of laboratory personnel based on laboratory
tests are not testimonial. Quoting from one of those cases, the court
reasoned that "'the critical inquiry is not whether it might be reasonably
anticipated that a statement will be used at trial but the circumstances
under which the statement was made.'"27 ' Thus, presumably, the
circumstances surrounding laboratory tests suggest the tests are more
the recordation of observable events than documentation of past events.

269. Id. at 670, 665 S.E.2d at 380.
270. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005)).
271. Id. (citing State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 374-75 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007)).
272. Id. (quoting People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).

273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 670-71, 665 S.E.2d at 380.
Id at 671, 665 S.E.2d at 380.
Id.
Id. at 672, 665 S.E.2d at 381 (quoting Geier, 161 P.3d at 140).
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Definition of Hearsay

If only as a matter of historical oddity, it is appropriate every few
years or so for this Survey to note Georgia's rather schizophrenic
approach to the definition of hearsay. If asked the definition of hearsay,
most Georgia lawyers almost certainly would say hearsay is an out-ofcourt statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein.
In fact, this is the definition of hearsay used most frequently by Georgia
courts.277 However, this is not Georgia's statutory definition of hearsay. Rather, O.C.G.A. § 24-3-127s defines hearsay as "that which does
not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness but rests mainly
on the veracity and competency of other persons. 279 Thus, a testifying
witness's out-of-court statement is hearsay under the common definition
of hearsay (although likely admissible pursuant to many exceptions for
prior statements by a witness), but such a statement would not be
hearsay under the statutory definition because it does not rest on the
"veracity and competency" of someone other than the testifying
witness.8 °
The court of appeals decision in Boivin v. State28 ' illustrates just
how fine the distinction can be when determining whether an out-ofcourt statement is hearsay. In Boivin the defendant was convicted of
stealing a utility trailer. The defendant admitted to possessing the
trailer, which turned out to be stolen, but he contended that he
purchased, or was in the process of purchasing, the trailer from someone
who identified himself as the owner. The defendant parked the trailer
on property he leased from Mark Gibby.2 2 Gibby, suspicious about the
defendant's story that he had purchased the trailer from "someone
named 'Mike' for $600 or $700," alerted a friend who in turn alerted
authorities after determining that the trailer was in fact stolen.s
After the trailer was returned to its true owner, someone who identified
himself as Mike visited Gibby, claimed that the trailer was his, and

277.
L. REV.
278.
279.

See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 44 MERCER
213, 235-36 (1992).
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (1995).
Id.

280. Id. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 52 MERCER
L. REV. 263, 287 (2000), for a discussion of Bowers v. State, 241 Ga. App. 122, 526 S.E.2d
163 (1999), in which the court of appeals relied on the statutory definition of hearsay to
affirm the admission of the witness's prior statement over the objection that it was an outof-court statement and thus hearsay. 241 Ga. App. at 124, 526 S.E.2d at 165-66.
281.

298 Ga. App. 411, 680 S.E.2d 415 (2009).

282. Id. at 412, 680 S.E.2d at 417.
283. Id.
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asked where it was. Gibby, perhaps feeling responsible for the
defendant's plight, managed to get Mike's tag number and reported it to
the police who at that point had no interest in pursuing any leads in the
matter, presumably because they had already arrested the defendant.2
Prior to Gibby's testimony at trial, the trial court granted the State's
motion to exclude any testimony by Gibby about Mike.'
After his
conviction, the defendant contended on appeal that Gibby's testimony
about his conversation with Mike was not hearsay, and the court of
appeals agreed.'
Quoting both the statutory and the traditional
definitions of hearsay, the court of appeals noted that a statement is
hearsay only when a jury is asked to assume or believe that the
declarant was being truthful when he made the statement.27 Here,
the defendant was not attempting to prove through Gibby that Mike was
telling the truth about his ownership of the trailer.'
Instead, the
defendant offered the statement because it was consistent with his
explanation of how he came to have the trailer: that someone named
Mike "claim[ed] to own the trailer and [took] actions consistent with his
claims."'
The only declarant the jury would be asked to believe was
Gibby, not Mike.2 Thus, it was Gibby's veracity, not Mike's, that was
29 1 Accordingly,
at issue.
the court reversed the defendant's convic29 2
tion.

Another example of fine distinctions is found in the court of appeals
opinion in Troutman v. State. 3 In Troutman the defendant was
accused of robbing a taxi driver who was dispatched to pick up a fare.
After the taxi driver picked up two men at the address to which she was
dispatched, one of the men pulled a gun and took the driver's cash. The
taxi driver then intentionally wrecked the taxi, and the two perpetrators
fled. Police later apprehended two men, and the taxi driver identified
them as the robbers. After his conviction, the defendant contended on
appeal that the trial court erroneously admitted a detective's testimony
that after confiscating the defendant's cell phone, he redialed a recent
number and discovered that the victim's employer, Decatur's Best Taxi

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 413, 680 S.E.2d at 418.
Id.
Id. at 413-14, 680 S.E.2d at 418.
Id. at 414, 680 S.E.2d at 418-19.
Id., 680 S.E.2d at 419.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
297 Ga. App. 196, 676 S.E.2d 836 (2009).

168

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Service, was called from the defendant's phone on the night of the
robbery. Initially, the detective made that determination by simply
calling the number, whereupon he was told he had called Decatur's Best
Taxi Service. In addition, the detective said he went to the taxi service's
business office to confirm that the telephone number in question was the
taxi service's number.'
The court of appeals summarily rejected the argument that the
detective's testimony was hearsay. 5 The court reasoned that "the
officer's statement that the phone number was for the taxi service is not
hearsay, but is a statement of undisputed fact."2" That reasoning
probably was not particularly satisfying to the defendant, whose point
clearly was that the detective was simply repeating what he was told,
and the prosecution was asking the jury to believe that the out-of-court
statement was true.297 The court of appeals, however, looked at the
situation a little differently. 298 The detective was testifying about the
results of his investigation, and "the value of the officer's testimony
rested on his own veracity and competence," not on the truthfulness of
what he was told.'
This view likely did not satisfy the defendant
either. Relying on out-of-court statements, the detective reached a
conclusion about whose number was dialed and then asked the jury to
believe that his investigation was credible because the information given
to him by the out-of-court declarants was credible. It may be that the
court's first explanation-that the testimony was not hearsay because it
was a matter of undisputed fact-is the best explanation. Some matters
are simply so clearly reliable and fundamental that we should not let the
hearsay rule stand in the way of the search for truth.
C. Admission in Pleadings
Most lawyers, particularly lawyers who primarily have a civil practice,
are familiar with the general rule that factual allegations in pleadings
constitute judicial admissions, regardless of whether the pleading is
signed by the party.3" Less well-known, however, is the fact that this
principle does not necessarily apply in criminal cases. In Carter v.
State,3"' the defendant attempted to introduce, during the testimony

294. Id. at 196-98, 676 S.E.2d at 838.
295. Id. at 198, 676 S.E.2d at 839.
296. Id.
297.

See id., 676 S.E.2d at 838-39.

298. See id., 676 S.E.2d at 839.
299.

Id.

300. See Morris v. Mullis, 264 Ga. App. 428, 438, 590 S.E.2d 823, 832 (2003).
301. 296 Ga. App. 598, 675 S.E.2d 320 (2009).
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of a witness, a motion to suppress filed by the witness's attorney in a
criminal action against the witness. 2 Although the motion was not
signed or verified by the defendant, she testified that her attorney
reviewed the motion with her and that the information contained in the
motion was true "'to the best of [her] knowledge.'""
The trial court
refused to admit the pleading even though it contained a factual
allegation contrary to the witness's testimony at trial.'
On appeal,
the court of appeals noted that while pleadings are admissible in civil
cases, they are not admissible in criminal cases unless it is demonstrated
that the accused has authorized the allegations in the pleadings. 3°s In
Carter the court of appeals acknowledged the witness's testimony that
she reviewed the motion with her attorney and that it was true to the
best of her knowledge, but the witness "was not specifically asked about
any particular statement contained in the motion such that it can be
said that she authorized the specific statement in question."3"
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse
30 7
its discretion when it refused to admit the motion.
D.

Statements by Coconspirators

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5,30 a statement by one conspirator
during the pendency of the conspiracy is admissible against his
coconspirators, 3°
and O.C.GA. § 24-3-52310 emphasizes that a
conspirator's confession made after the enterprise ends is admissible
only against himself.311 Case law, however, qualifies this rule somewhat by holding that while a conspirator's confession to law enforcement
incriminating a coconspirator ends the conspiracy and makes the
confession admissible against the coconspirator, a confession made to
someone other than a law enforcement officer does not end the conspiracy.3 12 Also, as discussed at some length in a previous survey, even

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 599, 675
at 600, 675
at 599-600,
at 600, 675
at 601, 675

S.E.2d at 321.
S.E.2d at 321 (alteration in original).
675 S.E.2d at 321.
S.E.2d at 321-22.
S.E.2d at 322.

O.C.G-A § 24-3-5 (1995).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-52 (1995).
Id.
See Fetty v. State, 268 Ga. 365, 371, 489 S.E.2d 813, 819 (1997).
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though the primary conspiracy may have ended, statements made during
the concealment phase of a conspiracy may still be admissible.3 13
In O'Neill v. State,314 a divided supreme court struggled with the
issue of when a conspiracy ends. In the case below, styled Bryant v.
State,315 the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction,
holding that the evidence sufficiently supported the defendant's
conviction for possession of methamphetamines.316 The supreme court
granted certiorari to consider whether a statement by the defendant's
coconspirator was admissible.3 17 This issue was critical because the
defendant's conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, and absent
the coconspirator's statement, the evidence was not sufficient to sustain
the defendant's conviction."1 8 The defendant was arrested with two
companions in a motel room. The defendant was unconscious at the
time of the bust, but his companions admitted to ownership of methamphetamines and other illegal drugs found during a search of the
room.319 According to the majority, one of the companions, after being
arrested, stated that the defendant's unconscious state was the result of
marital problems and "'drinking or smoking [methamphetamines] the
entire night.'" 2 ° According to the court of appeals, this statement,
along with the fact that the defendant was unconscious in the motel
room in close proximity to drugs, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. 3 ' To a majority of the supreme court, it was clear
that the statement incriminating the defendant was made to law
enforcement officers after the declarants had been taken into custody.322 Accordingly, the conspiracy ended, and the statement was not
admissible against the defendant.3 23 Absent the statement, the court
held, there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's
conviction. 24

313.

Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 55 MERCER L. REV.
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Justices Carley, Thompson, and Hines dissented.32 5

In an opinion

authored by Justice Hines, the dissent noted that the defendant agreed
to a bench trial and that in a bench trial, a trial court is presumed to
have considered only admissible evidence.326 Moreover, according to
the dissent, it was not clear that the incriminating statement by the
companion was made after the three men were taken into custody,
noting testimony that the men were not "'formally arrested'" until some
time later.3 2' Given the presumption that the trial court considered
only admissible evidence and the deference appellate courts must give
to finders of fact, the dissent argued that there was sufficient evidence
to support the conviction and that the majority simply "parsed the
evidence and substituted its judgment for that of the trial court."3"
The coconspirator exception, like most rules of evidence, has been
liberally construed in favor of the prosecution in recent years, but that
does not mean the necessary foundations for the admission of evidence
can be ignored. With regard to the coconspirator exception, it is
fundamental that before the prosecution can successfully tender an
alleged coconspirator's statement, it must first prove there was a
conspiracy.32 Apparently, the prosecution overlooked this elementary
requirement in Fisher v. State3 3 0 when the prosecution successfully

tendered the statement of one defendant bragging about a robbery he
and the defendant committed together.331

However, other than the

alleged coconspirator's statement, there was no evidence of a conspiracy. 33 2 Before a coconspirator's statement can be admitted, the prosecution must make a prima facie case that a conspiracy existed based on
evidence other than the coconspirator's statement.3" In Fisher the
prosecution made no effort to prove such a conspiracy.33 4

Therefore,

the trial court erred when it admitted the alleged coconspirator's statement.335
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E.

The 'Explain-Conduct"Exception to the Hearsay Rule
This year, the "explain-conduct" exception to the hearsay rule, codified
at O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2,6 has earned a subsection of its own in this
Article. Perhaps the best definition of the explain-conduct exception is
found in the supreme court's decision in Momon v. State. 7 First, the
court noted that the explain-conduct exception is technically not an
exception to the rule against hearsay; rather, it is nonhearsay because
it is not offered to prove the truth of the out-of-court statement.3 3
Concerned about overly broad interpretations of O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2, the
supreme court in Momon adopted the following rule:
When, in a legal investigation, the conduct and motives of the actor are
matters concerning which the truth must be found (i.e., are relevant to
the issues on trial), then information, conversations, letters and replies,
and similar evidence known to the actor are admissible to explain the
actor's conduct. But where the conduct and motives of the actor are
not matters concerning which the truth must be found (i.e., are
irrelevant to the issues on trial) then the information, etc., on which he
or she acted shall not be admissible under [O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2]. 39
As Crawfordincreasingly limits the admission of testimonial hearsay,
it seems that prosecutors are looking to other means to get out-of-court
statements before juries. The explain-conduct exception theoretically
avoids Crawford problems because the out-of-court statement, even if
testimonial, is not offered to prove the truth of the statement. For
example, as noted in a recent survey,34° the court of appeals in Little
v. State3" dodged a Crawford challenge to the admissibility of out-ofcourt statements made to a police officer by holding that the statements
were admissible to explain the conduct of the police officer.342 Yet,
Little flies in the face of a long line of Georgia cases, beginning with
Momon, that denounce the use of the explain-conduct exception to admit
out-of-court statements made to police officers. As the supreme court
said in Teague v. State,3 3

336. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2 (1995).
337. 249 Ga. 865, 294 S.E.2d 482 (1982).
338. Id. at 867, 294 S.E.2d at 484.
339. Id. (citations omitted).
340. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59 MERCER L. REV.
157, 184-85 (2007).
341. 280 Ga. App. 60, 633 S.E.2d 403 (2006).
342. Id. at 63, 633 S.E.2d at 405.
343. 252 Ga. 534, 314 S.E.2d 910 (1984).
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At heart, a criminal prosecution is designed to find the truth of what
a defendant did, and, on occasion, of why he did it. It is most unusual
that a prosecution will properly concern itself with why an investigating officer did something.
If the hearsay rule is to remain a part of our law, then [O.C.G.A. §1
24-3-2 ... must be contained within its proper limit. Otherwise, the
repetition of the rote words "to explain conduct" can become imprimatur for the admission of rumor, gossip, and speculation.'"
Yet, in the current survey period, the court of appeals again turned to
the explain-conduct exception to affirm the admission of out-of-court
statements made to police officers. In Stubbs v. State,' a robbery
victim testified at trial, but for some reason not explained in the opinion,
he did not provide a description of the clothing worn by the men who
stole his truck. Subsequently, during the testimony of a police officer,
the trial court permitted the police officer to testify about the description
of the clothing given by the victim in a pretrial statement, ruling that
the testimony was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement. 34
This, the court of appeals acknowledged, was clear error because no
foundation was laid for the admission of the statement as a prior
inconsistent statement. 34'7 The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the
defendant's conviction on the ground that the statement, although
inadmissible as a prior inconsistent statement, was admissible to explain
the officer's conduct when he subsequently searched the defendant's
residence for the clothing described by the victim.'
The court of
appeals made no effort to explain why the officer's conduct was relevant;
nor did the court distinguish Teague and other cases holding that the
explain-conduct exception can only rarely warrant the admission of
hearsay statements to explain police officer conduct."I9
Also during the survey period, the court of appeals in Johnson v.
350
State
affirmed the admission of hearsay testimony by an officer who

344. Id. at 536, 314 S.E.2d at 912; see also Britton v. State, 257 Ga. App. 441,442, 571
S.E.2d 451, 452-53 (2002) (reversing the defendant's conviction because the trial court, on
the basis of explaining conduct, erroneously admitted testimony that an anonymous
informant told a detective that the defendant would be driving a particular vehicle and

would have concealed money and drugs under a false bottom in the vehicle's console).
345. 293 Ga. App. 692, 667 S.E.2d 905 (2008).
346. Id. at 694-95, 667 S.E.2d at 908.

347. Id. at 694, 667 S.E.2d at 908.
348. Id. at 695, 667 S.E.2d at 908. The court of appeals also held that the statement

was part of the res gestae and thus admissible. Id. But, as discussed above, this would
seem to raise Crawford issues. See supra text accompanying notes 246-64.
349. See Stubbs, 293 Ga. App. at 695, 667 S.E.2d at 908.

350. 293 Ga. App. 32, 666 S.E.2d 452 (2008).
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received, during a morning briefing, a description of a suspect and stolen
pickup truck used in an armed robbery.35 1 This time, the court
acknowledged that only rare circumstances warrant the admission of
hearsay to explain police conduct.35 2 Quoting Morrow v. State,353 the
in
court reasoned that "'[this situation is one of the rare instances 354
which hearsay was properly used to explain the officer's conduct.'"
Further, the court noted, "The issue before the court with regard to this
testimony was not whether Johnson committed the armed robbery or
stole the pickup truck, but whether the briefing provided the officer with
a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying his investigation upon

spotting the vehicle in the abandoned parking lot."355 Yet in Morrow,

the officer's conduct, and thus the reasons for his conduct, was clearly
relevant. The parties in Morrow "stipulated that the trial court would
determine [the defendant's] guilt or innocence based on the evidence
presented at the motion to suppress hearing."3 One of the issues at
the motion to suppress hearing was whether evidence should have been
suppressed because the arresting officer did not have a warrant or
probable cause to make an arrest. Thus, the issue before the court at
the suppression hearing truly was whether the officer had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that would justify his investigation of the
defendant. Because the reasons for the officer's conduct were relevant
to an issue before the court, evidence that explained his conduct was
properly submitted.35 7 In Johnson, although the court of appeals
quoted or paraphrased Morrow in some detail, the court did not explain
why the reasons for the officer's conduct were relevant to any issue in
the case.358
Stubbs and Johnson can be contrasted with the court of appeals
decision in Deloatch v. State.359 In Deloatch the defendant contended,
among other things, that the trial court erroneously admitted a
detective's testimony about his discussions with a witness at the scene
and that based upon this discussion, the detective concluded that the
defendant was a suspect.3" The trial court ruled that the hearsay

351. Id. at 35, 666 S.E.2d at 456.
352. Id.

353. 257 Ga. App. 707, 708, 572 S.E.2d 58, 59 (2002).
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708, 572 S.E.2d at 59).
355. Id.
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testimony implicating the defendant was admissible because it "pertained to the officer's investigation," which the court of appeals
concluded meant the trial court thought the hearsay testimony was
" ' The court
admissible to explain the officer's conduct.36
of appeals had
no difficulty concluding that the admission of the hearsay testimony was
error, stating that in Teague, "the Court noted that only in 'rare
instances' would there be a need to explain police conduct."36 2
In Vega v. State, 3 the defendant argued that the trial court improperly excluded testimony by the investigating officer about a hearsay
statement made to him. The defendant argued that this testimony
should have been admitted under the explain-conduct exception because
it explained why the officer failed to investigate potentially exculpatory
evidence. Acknowledging that some such testimony is admissible only
in rare instances, the defendant argued that this rule should be applied
only to the prosecution and should not hinder a defendant's ability to
fully flesh out all circumstances of the case.3" The supreme court did
not bite; Momon and Teague, the court held, apply to both the prosecution and the defense.366
Finally, in Character v. State,36 the supreme court dealt with the
explain-conduct exception not in the context of testimony by law
enforcement officers, but in the context of witness testimony recounting
statements made by one of the deceased's victims. In Character,which
involved a group of truly nasty characters (pardon the pun, but it helps
to make the point of the case), the defendants appealed their convictions
for numerous crimes, including two murders and an aggravated assault.
The circumstances leading up to the crimes involved thefts of dice-game
proceeds and various romantic entanglements among the cast of
characters. The end result was a shootout at the Poole Palace that left
two dead and one injured.3 67
For purposes of this discussion, the relevant issue on appeal was
whether the trial court improperly allowed a witness to testify about the
victim's statements to the witness concerning the theft of the dice-game
proceeds. The prosecution contended that evidence of prior difficulties
among the parties was relevant, and the trial court allowed the
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testimony pursuant to the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. 36 8
On appeal, the supreme court easily dismissed a Crawford objection,
noting that the statements by the victims to the witness were not
testimonial." Next, the court addressed whether the testimony was
hearsay and concluded that because the out-of-court statement was
offered to explain conduct and not to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement, the testimony was not hearsay.7 0 Thus, the
question then became whether the testimony was admissible under
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2.371 Just as the reasons for the conduct of a law
enforcement officer are rarely relevant, the reasons for the conduct of a
victim also generally are not relevant: "[A] victim's conduct is not a
matter 'concerning which the truth must be found' and. . . the victim's
out-of-court statements to a third party are thus not admissible to
explain the victim's motives or conduct."3 72 If, however, the defendant
knew of the statements made by the victim, then those statements
perhaps could have influenced the defendant's conduct or motives and,
in that event, they may be relevant. For such conversations to be
admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2 and Momon, the actor must know
about the conversations for them to be potentially relevant to explain the
actor's conduct or motive.373 In the case of a law enforcement officer,

as discussed above, the reasons for an officer's actions, including his
conduct and motive, are rarely relevant.3 74 In the case of a victim, the
reasons for the victim's conduct are not relevant, but it is possible that
a victim's statements, if known to the defendant, might have influenced
the defendant's conduct or motives.
However, the court pointed to its own decision in Perry v. State375 as
a potential problem with the Momon rule. In Perry, "a garden variety
case involving prior difficulties in which the victim told her friends about
the defendant's prior abuse of her,"376 the supreme court held that the
victim's out-of-court statements were admissible to explain the motive
for the killing even though the defendant was unaware of the conversations.3 7 In Characterthe court was satisfied that Perry was incorrectly decided and overruled Perry to the extent that it held a victim's out-of-
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court statements are admissible even if they are unknown to the
defendant.37 In addition, to the extent Perry suggested that a victim's
conduct is a relevant matter concerning which the truth is to be found
and that a victim's statements are admissible to explain that conduct,
such a holding was overruled as well.379
The bottom line is, or should be, that the explain-conduct exception
only allows the admission of out-of-court statements (1) made to police
officers if the reason for the officer's conduct is relevant to an issue in
the case and (2) made by victims if relevant to the defendant's conduct,
which is only true if the statements are known to the defendant.

378. Character,285 Ga. at 116-17, 674 S.E.2d at 285.
379. Id. at 117, 674 S.E.2d at 285.

